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The conventional Nordic historiography of World War II states that there were few, if any, 
in the Nordic countries who perceived a significantly increased threat of war between 
1938 and early 1940. At the same time, historical methods face problems when it comes to 
characterizing often unexpressed beliefs of a large number of people living in the past. In 
this paper, we present an alternative way to estimate these assessments by analyzing sud-
den changes in sovereign debt yields collected from the Nordic bond markets of this time. 
Our results suggest that the Nordic contemporaries indeed perceived significant war risk 
increases around the time of major war-related geopolitical events. While these findings 
hence question some – but not all – of the standard Nordic World War II historiography, 
they also demonstrate the value of analyzing historical market prices to reassess the often 
tacit views and opinions of large groups of people in the past. 
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1  Introduction 
The question of whether people in the Nordic countries perceived an increased threat of 
war during the turbulent period between 1938 and early 1940 has been intensely discussed 
among Nordic historians during the entire postwar era. According to the conventional 
Nordic historiography, there were few, if any, in these countries who believed in such an 
increased war threat. This result has important implications as it, e.g., squares with the fact 
that the Nordic countries, possibly with exception for Finland, was relatively militarily 




There are, however, some problems with the way that conventional historiography has de-
scribed these historical widely held pre-war threat assessments. For example, historians 
primarily rely on in-depth analyses of recorded sources whereas popularly held threat as-
sessments in the past were hardly written down to allow such a study. Moreover, histori-
ans have since long (see, e.g., Carr, 1961 or Marwick, 1970) been aware of the risk that 
historians are influenced by their own social and political context in such way that it may 
influence their analysis of historical events, e.g., in the selection and interpretation of is-
sues, angles or even particular sources.
2  
 
In the present paper, we present an alternative way to gain insight into the war threat as-
sessments of people in the Nordic countries that can be compared with the ones in the his-
tory books. This method is based on estimating sudden changes in yields of government 
bonds that were traded continuously at the time of the war outbreak and link them to major 
geopolitical pre-war events. We argue that this will show if and when significant war risk 
increases occurred as reflected by market prices. The underlying idea is that wars put ex-
traordinary pressures on countries’ fiscal balances and may even provoke governments to 
                                                 
1 For example, Lidegaard (2005, p. 152) shows that the Danish government regarded a small and obviously 
insufficient military defense as a credible signal to Germany of peaceful Danish intentions. Jakobson (1961, 
pp 139ff) shows how Finland was fully mobilized in October 1939 but then started demobilizing in mid-
November, a few weeks before the Soviet attack. On the poorly prepared Norwegian defense, see Skodvin 
(1991, p. 309). On the insufficient level of Swedish armament and military preparations before the late 
spring of 1940, see (Åhslund (1982) and Olsson (1977, p. 12).  
2 Historians are themselves well aware of this problem. For example, Carr (1961) emphasized the interfer-
ence of historian with the historical writing behind the historical writing has been well understood. There are 
many examples of the biased historical writing resulting from winners writing the history of wars. Bryld 
(2003, pp. 14–29), e.g., argues that the official Danish postwar account of the country’s resistance movement 
during the war is a highly patriotic product in which historians have given in to contemporary pressures for a 
history of legitimization and national unification.   3
repudiate their sovereign debt. An increased risk of war will thus translate into an in-
creased sovereign risk or, equivalently, higher yields on traded sovereign debt.
3  
 
Our study specifically analyzes the (possible) occurrence of increased pre-war threat as-
sessments in the Nordic countries before and around the time of the outbreak of World 
War II.
4 We use newly assembled sovereign yields from the financial markets in Copen-
hagen, Oslo, Helsinki and Stockholm quoted in 1938–1940.
5 The empirical method is 
based on estimating structural breaks in the yield means using the well-known method of 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) which select the breaks endogenously, using only the time 
series properties of the yields and no prior historical information. These breaks reflect the 
contemporaneously updated sovereign risk assessments of the historical financial market 
actors. If they coincided with important political or military pre-war events, we argue that 
the sovereign yield changes were in fact driven by shifts in widely perceived threats of 
war.  
 
In a second part of our analysis, we compare these new market-based estimates of war 
threat assessments with the corresponding estimates in the Nordic historiography. This is 
done by first providing an outline of the “conventional” historical view, drawing on our 
reading of a large number of writings by well-known and reputed Nordic World War II 
historians. Of course, this representation is neither perfect nor complete, but we try to 
minimize the errors by supporting all statements by making explicit references and even 
citations to the underlying texts. Besides shedding new light on an interesting part of the 
modern history of the Nordic countries, this comparative analysis also addresses the im-
portant question whether conventional historiography is robust to alternative assessments 
of the same historical phenomena.  
 
The study connects with a growing literature that uses financial market data to analyze the 
impact of political and institutional change. In the groundbreaking analysis of Willard et 
al. (1996), events taking place during the U.S. civil war are analyzed based on their impact 
on the market for ”greenbacks”, a special currency issued by the Union. Following their 
                                                 
3 Naturally, this also requires minor changes in other standard bond yield determinants, such as the coupon 
rate, the time to maturity, tax status of cash flows, redemption clauses and the discount rate. Although these 
were mostly constant, we estimated the breaks using yield spreads (subtracting the Swedish yields) and 
hence canceling out market-specific determinants. These estimations produced essentially the same results 
and are available from the authors upon request. 
4 The overlap between, on one hand, the general public and political and military decision makers and, on 
the other, the bond traders and investors is admittedly far from perfect. Still both the public and the market 
actors acted to a significant extent on publicly available information. Hence, one should expect their views 
and expectations about the future to be roughly identical. As for the political and military leaders, however, 
they partly possessed non-public information from the secret services, and to the extent that their views dif-
fered from those of the public this will be discussed .  
5 Note that the fifth Nordic country, Iceland, is left out because of a lack of Icelandic government bond data.   4
approach, Frey and Kucher (2000, 2001) analyze how the events before and during World 
War II affected domestic and foreign government bond prices at the Zurich stock ex-
change. They find that these events consistently reflect many of the historically important 
events, such as the annexation of Austria by the Germans, the outbreak of the war, the 
German defeat at Stalingrad and the Yalta conference. Similar analyses of bond prices 
during World War II have been undertaken by Oosterlinck (2003) on France, Brown and 
Burdekin (2002) on German bonds traded in Britain, and by Frey and Waldenström (2004) 
on Belgian and German bonds traded simultaneously in Switzerland and Sweden. Focus-
ing on more contemporary war experiences and the forward-looking elements of financial 
markets, Rigobon and Sack (2005) find a considerable war risk premium in the returns of 
several common financial assets during the build-up before the U.S. war in Iraq 2003. 
With a similar focus, Wolfers and Zitzewitz (2005) find that the war probabilities during 
the same pre-Iraq war period derived from prices at so-called prediction markets, which 
are electronic venues trading securities with payoffs contingent on specific political or 
economic outcomes, were highly consistent with the flow of war-related news and events. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes how the conventional 
Nordic historiography has pictured pre-war threat assessments of the general public and 
some of the methodological problems it is associated with. Section 3 presents the data 
used and some of the institutional features of the Nordic bond markets around the time of 
the study. Section 4 discusses the empirical method. In Section 5, the main results of the 
study are presented and in Section 6 their robustness are analyzed. Section 7 summarizes 
the evidence and concludes.  
2  Nordic historiography on pre-World War II threats and its problems 
When historians characterize past sentiments among the general public, they face some 
important methodological problems. For example, public opinions are basically never ex-
plicit and, hence, documented in written form which makes them almost unobservable to 
historians in their written source-based analysis. Another, and perhaps more severe, prob-
lem is that historians, and in particular war historians, may be influenced by their own 
postwar political and social context when selecting and interpreting the historical facts at 
hand. This potential sample selection bias has been noted before by well-known historians 
(see, e.g., Carr, 1961 or Marwick, 1970) but it still seems to have prevailed in parts of the 
official Nordic World War II historiography.
6  
                                                 
6 For example, Bryld (2001) describes the Danish historiography of World War II as a “history of legitimiza-
tion” (p. 14). He states further: “The official history of the occupation was made up in 1945, a story of po-
litical and pragmatic art which satisfied the needs for political unity and ethical consistency of the elites [...] 
and the majority of the population. [...] The main element of this story telling was patriotism.” (p. 29). In the   5
 
Below is an outline of the “conventional” Nordic World War II historiography of people’s 
war threat assessments in the Nordic countries during 1938–1940. The outline consists of 
citations and references from texts by nineteen well-known and reputed Danish, Finnish, 
Norwegian and Swedish historians, most of them specializing on World War II history.
7 
Our focus on Nordic historians is motivated partly because we believe them to be best 
suited to capture past assessments of the Nordic citizens, but partly also as they correspond 
the most to the Nordic market actors whose assessments we derive below from bond mar-
ket prices. Naturally, we do not claim to have a complete coverage of the Nordic historical 
writing on this topic although we have tried to minimize the problems with interpretation 
and selection by making explicit references and citations to as many works as possible. 
 
Denmark: Historians agree that the Danes felt quite safe from being involved in any of the 
war activities taking place on the European continent and that the German invasion of 
Denmark on April 9, 1940, came as a total surprise. However, the Danes were well aware 
of their geographical proximity to Germany and when they, as the only Scandinavian 
country, signed a non-aggression pact with Germany in mid-1939 this was regarded as 
“ensuring peace and stability” (Nissen, 1988, p. 353f).
8 There is surprisingly little said 
about the reactions to the outbreak of war in Poland and Finland. There seems to have 
been some increased level of uncertainty after the Danish Prime Minister’s New Year’s 
speech in January 1940, in which he stated that Denmark would hardly be able to resist a 
foreign invasion, if it were to come about. People were infuriated by this defeatism, but 
according to Wendt (1966, pp. 41f) “All their worries disappeared entirely” when all par-
ties in Parliament immediately thereafter openly declared that Danish neutrality stood 
firm. One historian, Lidegaard (2005, p. 152), claims that Danish politicians were confi-
dent about their policy of passiveness and that it would minimize the risk of war: “the less 
Denmark did to attract [Hitler’s] attention the better”. Finally, when the German invasion 
came, Gram (1986, p. 15) asserts that it came as a surprise: “With the greater part of Nor-
wegian and Danish political and public concerns focused on the British laying of mines, 
the German strategic plan for a command of Norway – and the occupation of Denmark it 
would require – achieved in creating a complete surprise.” 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
case of Norway, Skodvin (1991, pp. 309f) describes that there were many postwar forces interested in influ-
encing the war history so that “their own people” came out as favorable as possible in the descriptions. 
7 It should be noted, however, that behind these nineteen researchers are a scanning of the works of at least 
twice as many Nordic historians but whose writings say nothing about the public sentiments at this time. 
One comprehensive listing of the Nordic World War II literature is Nøkleby (2003). Although the Finnish 
historian Max Jakobson, lacks a formal academic background, his works are widely cited and used by pro-
fessional historians in all Nordic countries. 
8 Note that all citations of Nordic historians (except Jakobson, 1961) are translations from their original lan-
guages made by us.   6
Finland: Most Finnish historians describe the Soviet Union as being perceived as a latent 
threat by the Finns in the 1930’s. There was even open mutual distrust between the two 
countries’ politicians (Zetterberg, 1991, p. 56). Yet Jakobson (1961, p. 99) writes that 
“there was no sense of immediate danger in Finland during the beautiful late summer of 
August and September 1939”. Interestingly, the views from the Swedish horizon were 
more pessimistic: “The German-Russo pact [publicly announced on August 23] placed 
Finland in an awkward position: Everybody could see that it offered Russia its best chance 
to re-conquer Finland since 1920” (Thulstrup, 1950, p. 8). Later on, however, also the 
Finns perceived an increased Soviet threat. Jakobson (1961, p. 139) writes that although 
Foreign Minister Paasikivi in mid-November believed that Stalin would leave Finland in 
peace, “The majority, however, held a different view of Stalin’s intensions”. Finally, it is 
not clear if the Finns really anticipated the Soviet attack which eventually came on No-
vember 30 or if the did not. On the one hand, Finland was fully mobilized already in early 
October but, on the other hand, the government started to send troops home from the front 
from mid-November onwards. Perhaps this is explained by the evidence found after the 
war which says that in late November “most diplomatic observers” in Finland and in Mos-
cow thought that “the Soviet Union would not try to enforce its claims on Finland or Ro-
mania by force of arms” (Jakobson, 1961, p. 142).  
 
Norway: Historians agree that of all Northerners the Norwegians felt the most safe from 
becoming involved in a war on the European continent. The German invasion in April 
1940, therefore, is described as a complete surprise. As in the Danish case, very little is 
said about the public’s reaction to the wars on the continent and in Finland. Not even the 
Altmark incident on February 16, 1940 is described as having affected the Norwegians. 
During this incident, British troops boarded a German destroyer in Norwegian waters. 
This launched a fierce German protests against Norway which resulted in a sharp Norwe-
gian protest against Britain (Skodvin, 1991, pp. 38f). The German invasion, finally, came 
as a surprise. Bull (1979, pp. 342f) states that its “surprise tactics was a success” and that 
many citizens of Oslo, “woken up in the night by the sirens warning for an airborne attack 
were annoyed since they believed it to be just another practice exercise”. Furthermore, 
Jensen (1965, p. 113) writes: “On the basis of what everyone knew [at the time], the situa-
tion was so serious that it now seems unimaginable that we did not react any differently 
than we did. It only shows how deeply rooted the belief had generally become among the 
Norwegians, that we could manage to keep out of the conflict. The parliament and gov-
ernment were representatives of a view that was general.”  
 
Sweden: As for the Swedish public, most – but not all – historians describe them has hav-
ing felt quite sure of remaining outside the war. Åberg (1992, p. 522) states that “In the   7
beginning of the war, none of the governments in Sweden, Norway and Denmark seems to 
have worried about a German attack on Scandinavia”. Carlgren (1989, p. 150) asserts that 
“there is a striking contrast between the confidence shown [after the outbreak of World 
War II] and the widespread popular worries that followed the outbreak of World War I”. 
By contrast, Johansson (1982, p. 138) offers a somewhat different picture when he argues 
that the Finnish war made the Swedes more aware of the external military threats: “When 
the world war broke out the Nordic countries did not seem threatened. Many people re-
garded the Pact in Moscow as assuring peace to the Baltic region. [...] The war between 
Finland and the Soviet Union, however, was a severe blow that stunned Sweden.” He con-
tinues: “There was a general agreement among the overwhelming majority of the popula-
tion that Sweden must use each day still in peace to arm its military defense. The dominat-
ing sentiment was that Sweden enjoyed a respite under the gallows which had to be ex-
ploited.” (Johansson, 1982, p. 139). In his important work on the ideological underpin-
nings of the Swedish newspaper editorialists during 1938–1939, Åmark (1973, pp. 155ff) 
argues while there were a public awareness of a military threat towards Sweden, it was 
limited. For example, he states that “there was agreement on that Sweden faced a small 
risk of war as long as there was no war in the rest of Europe” and, similarly, that “An out-
break of war in Europe was hence a necessary but no sufficient condition for an attack on 
Sweden” (p. 155). An interesting example of how contemporary ideology could influence 
written statements is that the editorialists often “deliberately exaggerated the risk of war in 
order to pursue their own [politico-ideological] agenda in the foreign and defense policy” 
(p. 160). Perhaps a sign of Sweden nevertheless demobilized its already limited number of 
military forces on a broad frontier after Germany’s invasion of Denmark and Norway, 
which according to Norborg (1981, pp. 249ff) signifies a firm belief that Sweden would 
not be drawn into the war activities.
9 On balance, it is fair to say that historians would de-
scribe the Swedish threat assessments as practically nonexistent during most of this period, 
perhaps with exception for the time of the Finnish-Soviet war (November 30, 1939 – 
March 12, 1940). 
3  Data and institutional setting 
Our main dataset consists of secondary market yields of government bonds of the four 
Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. These yields to maturity were 
computed from newly assembled daily and weekly bid prices quoted at the bond markets 
                                                 
9 Two much more imminent threats of war to Sweden, according to Norborg (1981, p. 255) and Johansson 
(2002), were the “Midsummer Crisis” in June 1941, when the Swedish government considered refusing the 
Germans to ship troops across Swedish territory, and the “February Crisis” in February 1942 when the 
Swedes sent large numbers of troops to the Norwegian border in order to meet an expected German invasion 
based on cracked German secret messages.   8
in Copenhagen, Helsinki, Oslo and Stockholm during January 1938–December 1940. We 
hence restrict our analysis to the absolute end of the peaceful interwar era since we other-
wise would risk capturing numerous other (mostly unobservable) sovereign yield shifts not 
necessarily related to the immediate risk of war. A supplementary dataset with weekly 
U.S. yields on long-term government bonds and 3-5 year Treasury notes as well as 
monthly yields on British and Swiss sovereign debt was also collected for the robustness 
analysis in Section 6.
10 Detailed information on these individual bond loans and their 
sources is listed in Table 1. The slight variation in data coverage across markets is primar-
ily due to a general difficulty of finding good data sources, but in the case of Helsinki 
Stock Exchange all bond trading was stopped from October 11, 1939. 
 
The quality and consistency of the quoted bond prices require that the quality of underly-
ing market institutions as well as the level of trading activity were sufficiently high. His-
torical bond markets have been shown to be highly sophisticated relative to today’s market 
places in terms of information dissemination and market thickness. For example, Mauro et 
al. (2006) convincingly argue that this was indeed the case for the sovereign debt market 
in London during 1870–1914. While no such information exists about the Nordic sover-
eign debt markets of the late 1930s, we have collected some pieces of evidence suggesting 
that also these markets functioned sufficiently well in order for their prices to hold for 
meaningful scrutiny. Specifically, a sample of daily trading volumes from the Stockholm 
Stock Exchange price lists during March, June, September and December in 1938 and 
1940 show that there was trading in all four Nordic government bonds at all times, except 
for Norwegian bonds that were sparsely traded after April 1940. Furthermore, estimates of 
bond transaction volumes at the over-the-counter market indicate that the OTC market was 
between three and five times larger than the exchange-based trading.
11 
 
Government interventions in the bond markets surely took place given that borrowing 
governments usually are interested in keeping market interest rates, i.e., their cost of capi-
tal, as low as possible. Available anecdotal evidence from the Danish and Stockholm mar-
kets, however, suggests that these initiatives were both relatively few and had probably a 
limited long-run effect on market yields.
12 Since our analysis of sovereign yield changes 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the U.S. weekly yields are weekly averages dated on each Friday whereas the Nor-
dic yields in Stockholm are quoted on the Tuesday of the corresponding week.  
11 OTC trading volumes are estimated using securities transaction tax receipts, which by law were to be re-
ported for all transfers regardless of market place. Data only exist for the first half-year 1926 in a survey by 
the Swedish Banking Inspection reported in a government proposal (Prop. 1927:56 p. 13) and for 1948 on-
wards from the Banking Inspection’s recurrent official publication Uppgifter om bankerna samt uppgifter 
om fondkommissionärerna och fondbörs. 
12 Kock (1943) argues that the Swedish Riksbank had almost no effect on market interest rates in 1939-1940. 
The Danish central bank, Nationalbanken, only increased its bond portfolio marginally between June and 
December 1939, and even decreased during the most critical period, December 1939 and June 1940 (Svend-  9
focus on very large and lasting yield shifts, moreover, we do not expect any government-
led market operations to significantly influence our main findings.  
 
The identity of the bond market actors is of high interest to a study like ours. The overlap 
between, on one hand, the general public and, on the other, the bond traders and investors 
is probably not perfect. Financial institutions such as commercial banks, insurance compa-
nies and stock brokers most likely represented most of the trading on the stock exchange.  
Still, households held about 6% of all Swedish government bonds in 1940 which, if one 
assumes an average bond amount equal to twice the average income, implies that more 
than 33,000 households owned, bought and sold Swedish government bonds.
13 More im-
portantly, both market traders and households acted on the same, publicly available infor-
mation and one should therefore expect their views and expectations about the future to be 
roughly identical. Moreover,  
 
One of the problems with the data from the Stockholm market is that there are missing 
values in the Finnish yields (in December 1939) and the Norwegian yields (in April-May 
1940). Since our econometric methodology requires the analyzed series to be continuous 
we linearly interpolate all gaps. Missing could indicate severe problems with, e.g., low 
levels of trading or the price reporting. By consequently using bid and not sell prices we at 
least diminish the risk of having individual traders influencing prices. More importantly, 
most gaps appear after the outbreak of wars in the respective Nordic countries and since 
our focus primarily lies on the behavior of pre-war yields we feel confident that this prob-
lem has no significant impact on the basic findings of this study. 
4  Empirical methodology 
Our basic methodology is to link major shifts in sovereign yields with simultaneous geo-
political events and thereby get a notion of changes in widely held war threat perceptions 
as reflected in bond markets. We focus on shifts rather than levels of the yields since there 
are many influences of a sovereign bond’s yield level whereas a large and, in particular, 
sudden shift does more likely reflect a shock to the continuously update sovereign risk-
assessments made by market actors.  
                                                                                                                                                   
sen, 1968, p. 16). Furthermore, the monetary policy issues addressed by Nationalbanken itself in the early 
war years rather concerned how to prevent interest rates from falling too much in the light of the abundant 
liquidity levels in the Danish economy. In other words, the Danish central bank worked to raise, not reduce, 
market interest rates during the war period.  
13 According to the Swedish Riksbank’s Statistical Yearbook of 1942 (pp. 62f), 6 percent of the outstanding 
Swedish government debt in 1940 was about SEK 165 million. The average annual income of all Swedes in 
1940 was SEK 2,293 (Roine and Waldenström, 2006). If predominantly middle- and upper-class people in-
vested in bonds at an average amount of SEK 5,000 (i.e., more than twice the average annual income), one 
gets a guesstimate of there being some 33,000 household investors in Swedish government bonds in 1940.   10
 
We employ a standard econometric methodology for testing for and estimating unknown 
multiple structural breaks in univariate time series, developed by Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003).
14 Among the many advantages of using this methodology is that it does not require 
any prior information about the existence or timing of breaks. Instead it estimates them 
endogenously, using only the information contained in the time series, i.e., letting the data 
speak. While this technique has been shown to be important to ensure consistency of the 
estimated breaks (Perron, 2006), it also removes any possibility of a researcher influence 
in picking the significant shifts that are to be evaluated against the contemporaneous po-
litical development.  
 
We estimate the breaks by fitting the following system of linear regressions: 
 
yt  =  cj  +  εt,     t = Tj–1+1, ... , Tj.   (1) 
 
where subscript j (j = 1,…, m + 1) denotes segments separated by m structural breaks, yt is 
a country’s nominal sovereign yield at time t expressed in basis points, cj is an estimated 
intercept (the average yield in each segment) and εt is a white noise error term.
15 The pro-
cedure of the method is, in brief, to begin by testing for existence of breaks using two 
types of Wald tests. If these indicate that breaks exist, the method continues by estimating 
their exact number and then their size. One important parameter to decide before the esti-
mations is how long the shortest allowed segment length can be in order for breaks to be 
called “structural”. We follow the conventions and require breaks to be at least ten percent 
of the total sequence length (denoted as “T” in Table 1). Specifically, our segments are 
about 20 days in the daily series and 16 weeks in our weekly series.
16  
 
Our motivation for using a relatively simplistic model as in equation (1) is that this mean 
model produces intuitive and easily interpreted estimates of the structural breaks; the 
break size, ĉj – ĉj–1, is the number of basis points with which the yields increase or de-
crease.  
 
                                                 
14 For details of the method’s inferential setup, we refer the reader to the papers by Bai and Perron (1998, 
2003). All estimations use the GAUSS program available from Pierre Perron’s web page. 
15 We follow the convention of using T0 = 1 and Tm+1 = T (total length of sequence).  
16 Ideally, one would have liked the shortest segments to be the same across all markets, i.e., that we used 
shorter segments in the weekly Stockholm series. But in order for there to be enough number of observations 
within each segment we had to settle at 10 percent. Technically, we set the trimming parameter π to be 0.10 
(10 percent), i.e., that Tj ≥ π·T.segment lengths hence being at least. Bai and Perron (2005) recommend hav-
ing at least 18 observations in each segment for the calculation of variance-covariance matrices.   11
Two potentially problematic modeling issues arise. First, most high-frequency financial 
variables exhibit some degree of persistency which are not fully accounted for in (1). The 
Bai and Perron methodology has an apparatus for dealing with a wide range of error dis-
tributions, however, and it alleviates most such modeling concerns. Moreover, simulations 
by Paye and Timmerman (2006) suggest that persistency has limited effect on the ability 
of Bai and Perron’s method to consistently pick the correct break points, especially when 
break magnitudes are large (which they are indeed in our analysis)  
 
A second modeling issue of importance is that nominal sovereign yields also pick up in-
fluences from factors other than the default risk, predominantly various macroeconomic 
fluctuations such as inflation or market interest rates and expectations about them. We ad-
dress this influence in a number of robustness tests reported in Section 6. Specifically, we 
replaced the yields in equation (1) with yield spreads calculated as the Nordic yields di-
vided by yields of U.S., British, Swiss and Swedish (for the non-Swedish Nordic coun-
tries) in a variety of ways. The yield spreads should, in principle, cancel out all common 
macroeconomic influences and leave the sovereign risk as sole determinant. The results 
are basically identical with the main results of the paper, which again indicates a satisfac-
tory robustness of our method and findings. 
 
Finally, what is the expected impact of a war on a country’s sovereign yields and how 
should one interpret the magnitudes of a structural break in terms of changes in the per-
ceived threat of war? Unfortunately, there are no clear-cut answers to these questions in 
either asset pricing theory or financial history. In principle, borrowing countries balance 
their expected costs of a default (reputational losses resulting in costlier future borrowing) 
with their benefits (retained cash that is not paid out to lenders). Wars may alter both costs 
and benefits in different directions due to many factors, e.g., the fiscal status and credit 
histories of countries, the extent and length of the war and the setup of existing debt con-
tracts (e.g., presence of gold clauses). Looking at history, Suter (1992, pp. 61–83) provides 
several examples of belligerent countries that were either defaulters or that kept on servic-
ing their debt. In an attempt to determine the effect on sovereign yields by the arrival of 
news of wars, Mauro et al. (2006, ch. 5) show that emerging market yields quoted in Lon-
don in 1870–1914 increased by on average 300 basis points (which is almost a doubling of 
yields) as a result of war news. Additional evidence on the robustness of interwar bond 
investors is the remarkable cases of government bonds issued by countries that formally 
had ceased to exist, e.g., Tsarist Russia after 1917 or Austria after 1938, that kept on being   12
traded and quoted at almost normal yield levels for years.
17 Hence, historical evidence 
suggests that while wars did not automatically imply that belligerent countries defaulted 
on their debt there seem to have been fears of this eventuality as shown by significantly 
increased market yields. 
5  Results and comparative analysis 
5.1  Structural breaks in Nordic sovereign yields 
Table 2 presents the estimated structural breaks in the Nordic sovereign yields before the 
outbreak of World War II in the respective countries.
18 Consider first the Danish yields 
quoted in Copenhagen (Figures 1 and 2). They exhibit several positive breaks at the time 
of major war events, clearly indicating that Danes perceived an increased level of sover-
eign risk well before the German invasion in early April 1940. The first two breaks, 
amounting to a combined increase of 120 basis points, occurred around the time of the 
outbreak of World War II. The third break occurred in mid-February 1940, coinciding 
with the Altmark incident off the Norwegian coast (discussed above). Looking at the Dan-
ish yields in Stockholm (Figure 3), we see similar, but even stronger indications of in-
creased war threats in 1939. There is a very small, and seemingly politically insignificant 
break in late 1938, but then there is a notable break in late March 1939, shortly after the 
German annexation of Czechoslovakia. A third break occurred in late August 1939, simul-
taneously with the first break in Copenhagen. The fourth break is recorded in early De-
cember 1939, just after the Soviet attack on Finland. This break increased Danish yields 
by 215 basis points. Finally, the German invasion of Denmark on April 9, 1940, which had 
been recorded in Stockholm since Sweden was still neutral and at peace, produced a sig-
nificant break of +361 basis points, but the initial spike during the first week after the in-
vasion amounted to +1,900 basis points! Hence, these results show that the traders in 
Denmark and Sweden perceived a clearly increased war threat on Denmark well ahead of 
the German invasion. The invasion spike in the Stockholm yields, reflecting the yield un-
der realization of war, however, suggests that the Swedish investors still believed that a 
continued peace was more likely than the outbreak of war in Denmark.
19  
 
                                                 
17 Oosterlinck and Landon-Lane (2006) show that Tsarist Russian bonds kept being traded in Paris in 1918–
1919 on yields averaging at no more than 8 percent! Similarly, Austrian bonds traded in Zurich throughout 
World War II at about a 15 percent yield (Frey and Kucher, 2000). 
18 There are additional results from the estimations that do not appear in the table, including the SupFT(ℓ|0)- 
and max1≥ℓ≥LSupFT(ℓ|0)-tests for existence as well as the sequential SupFT(ℓ+1|ℓ)-test for the number of 
breaks. These are available upon request.  
19 An “assessed war probability”, calculated as the Stockholm yields right before the war divided by the tip 
of the yield spike right after the war outbreak, for Denmark is 40% (750 bp / 1,150 bp = 0.395).   13
Consider now the Finnish government bonds at home and abroad. The Finnish yields in 
Helsinki (Figure 4) exhibit two very small, and unimportant, breaks recorded during Feb-
ruary-March 1939. By contrast, a third break on September 6, of +62 basis points suggests 
that the outbreak of war on the continent was clearly perceived as affecting Finland in a 
negative way. Since the Helsinki Stock Exchange closed down all bond trading on Octo-
ber 11, we cannot tell from the yields how the Finns reacted to the continued development 
although the closure of the stock exchange by itself indicates increasing fears of a substan-
tially increased political turbulence. The Finnish yields in Stockholm (Figure 5) contain 
three structural breaks, the first one in early September 1939, i.e., at the same time as in 
Helsinki but much larger, of +862 basis points. The second break was in early December, 
i.e., after the Soviet attack on Finland, which increased the yields by an additional 2,083 
basis points! The third break occurred in mid-March 1940, immediately after the Soviet-
Finnish truce, and interestingly it was by –1,298 basis points. In other words, while both 
Finns and Swedes interpreted the German-Russo anti-aggression pact and the outbreak of 
war in Poland as strongly increased external threats to Finland, the actual outbreak of war 
in Finland further increased the sovereign risk (in Sweden). 
 
Consider, thirdly, the Norwegian government bonds. The Norwegian yields in Oslo (Fig-
ure 6) experienced five structural breaks. Of these, the first four in early September, mid-
October, early December 1939, and one in late January 1940 were significant increases of 
132 basis points in total. While the September and December breaks are clearly associated 
with war events in Poland and Finland, the other two are less obviously related with the 
war developments. The last break occurred in mid-March 1940, directly in relation to the 
announced truce in Finland and, interestingly, it was a yield cut by 55 basis points indicat-
ing a lowered perceived threat after this peace event. As for the Norwegian yields in 
Stockholm (Figure 7), they portray a much more homogenous picture. The first break in 
early September 1939 was a 201 basis points increase and the second +176 basis point 
break in late December clearly indicate increased war threats to Norway, as perceived by 
traders in Sweden. Then there was a third break recorded just after the German invasion, 
in April 1940, measuring +333 basis points and hence indicating that the eventuality of 
war was not entirely capitalized by the Swedish market actors. Later in 1940 there is a 
fourth break of –243 basis points, which most likely signals the resolved uncertainty about 
the effects of the German occupation on Norway’s economy and, perhaps, even status as a 
sovereign nation. 
 
Finally, consider the Swedish government bonds. The Swedish yields recorded in Stock-
holm (Figure 8) experienced five structural breaks between 1938 and 1940. Three of these 
were significant yield increases occurring right at the time of several major war events: the   14
outbreak of the war in early September 1939 (+66 basis points), the Finnish-Soviet war in 
December 1939 (+44 basis points) and the German invasion of Denmark and Norway in 
early April 1940 (+15 basis points). An interesting observation is that the yield increases 
get smaller the closer the war gets to Scandinavia. This could signal that Swedes regarded 
the risk of an attack on Sweden as being independent of the risk of attacks on the other 
Nordic countries. Given the vast importance of the Swedish iron ore exports to, in particu-
lar, the German war industry such a conjecture may actually have been plausible at the 
time. 
  
A general finding of these estimations is the interesting distribution of responses to the 
events across geographical borders. While foreign and domestic traders react almost iden-
tically in time to the same major political events, the magnitude of their reactions in terms 
of basis point changes differ by a factor of between five and fifteen. The Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, for example, boosted the Danish government yields by 51 basis points in 
Copenhagen but by 136 basis points in Stockholm. Similarly, the Soviet invasion of 
Finland raised Norwegian sovereign yields by 48 basis points in Oslo but 176 basis points 
in Stockholm. The reasons for this heterogeneity has been studied by Waldenström (2006), 
who looks at the specific case of the Danish sovereign debt traded in Copenhagen and 
Stockholm in the late 1930s and the entire 1940s. The single most important explanation 
for this discrepancy is that governments tend to discriminate against foreign investors vis-
à-vis their domestic counterparts and that this is mainly driven by political power con-
cerns.
20 
5.2  Comparing the views of historians and markets 
We now go on to compare the estimates of pre-war threat assessments made by historians 
(discussed in Section 2) and bond markets (discussed in Section 5.1). Neither approach is 
free from methodological and data-related problems and this exercise is hence not about 
any version being “right” or “wrong” or “better” or “worse”. Rather, we wish to shed light 
on whether they differ at all and, if so, why and in what way. In Table 3, we summarize 
the findings from previous sections by periodically classifying the assessed threat levels 
by country and methodological approach. A first result is that there is agreement on that 
Nordic people perceived little external threat before late August 1939. Although the Dan-
ish yields rose in March of that year, the substantial yield increases came right after the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop pact or the German attack on Poland one week later. This also sug-
gests that the Nordic people did not compare themselves to Austria and Czechoslovakia in 
                                                 
20 Competing hypotheses rejected by Waldenström (2006) are local government (or central bank) interfer-
ence in bond market to keep yields low, institutional differences in market regulations and microstructure, 
and different degrees of risk aversion across the national markets.   15
terms of foreign policy relations with “big neighbor” Germany, at least judging from the 
lack of major threat increases recorded after their annexations in 1938 and 1939, respec-
tively. 
 
The most significant result from the comparison is the discrepancy in perceived threats 
between the two versions. In short, the financial markets signal substantially higher war 
risk expectations than historians do. For example, whereas historians report that the Danes 
and Norwegians felt largely secure up to the German invasion, the markets display several 
dramatic yield increases following some of the most important war-related events: the 
German-Russo Pact, the outbreak of World War II, the war between Finland and the So-
viet Union as well as some minor events in early 1940. In the case of the Finns, both the 
Finnish and Swedish financial markets reflect significant war threats after the German-
Russo Pact and the outbreak of war, whereas historians suggest there were none. Interest-
ingly, not even the Finnish political and military leaders, who were arguably better in-
formed than the Finnish people, perceived a larger war threat more in line with the bond 
markets before the Soviet attack. In fact, our historical outline in section 2 showed that 
while the Finnish people in October 1939 started feeling seriously uneasy with the Soviet 
intentions after having observed the Soviet annexations of the Baltic states, the Finnish 
government continued to put their trust into the benevolence of Stalin and even withdrew 
troops from the front in late November.  
 
There are, however, several points of agreement between the historians and the markets. 
One such instance is the fact that the Norwegian yields in Oslo actually decreased after the 
announcement of the Moscow truce in March 1940, which hence was interpreted as lower-
ing the risk of war on Norwegian soil. It should be noted, however, that the Swedes did 
not seem to have reached the same conclusions as the Norwegian yields in Stockholm 
stayed at their relatively high pre-invasion level through March. Another example of con-
currence is the fact that the realization of war in Finland, Denmark and Norway gave rise 
to yield spikes in the respective countries’ bonds traded in Stockholm. If anything, this 
indicates that there was no one who fully anticipated the wars, which hence supports the 
claims of historians. Judging from the magnitudes of the estimated breaks relative the 
short-term spikes, which reflect the prospected yield under the realization of war, the mar-
ket actors viewed the probability of war in Denmark, Finland and Norway as being some-
where around 50 percent.
21 
                                                 
21 The “assessed war probabilities”, calculated as the pre-war yields (just before the outbreak of war) divided 
by the tip of the yield spike right after the war outbreak, are for Denmark 40% (recall the previous section), 
for Finland 35% (1,100 bp / 3,200 bp = 0.344) and for Norway 54% (700 bp / 1,300 bp = 0.538).   16
6  Robustness analysis 
As we highlighted in Section 4 when discussing the estimation of structural breaks in sov-
ereign yields, there is a risk that the sudden mean-shifts may be partly, or wholly, driven 
by an unobserved simultaneous shock to some nominal macroeconomic variable (e.g., in-
flation or market interest rates) which, in turn, would have a first-order impact on the 
nominal bond yield. In order to control for such exogenous effects, we rerun the structural 
breaks analysis but now use sovereign yield spreads on the left hand side. Yield spreads 
should, at least in principle, cancel out all common macroeconomic influences and leave 
the spread being solely determined by the sovereign risk. Unfortunately, any common 
elements of sovereign risk across certain types of countries, which we also would like to 
capture in our breaks, would also be eliminated when using spreads. For example, if there 
would be an increased risk of attack directed specifically to all neutral countries, Nordic 
spreads over, say, Swiss sovereign yields would not be able to contain this risk compo-
nent.  
 
If we find that the breaks estimated when using spreads are different from those using 
yields in terms of a) the occurrence and timing of break dates and b) the magnitudes of the 
estimated breaks, we would be inclined to seriously doubt the robustness of our previous 
findings. In particular, if the spreads do not contain any statistically significant positive 
pre-war breaks around the time of the major geopolitical shocks, our prime identifier of 
increased war threat assessments of the general public, our core results would be more or 
less rejected. We compute spreads by subtracting from each Nordic yield an equivalent 
government yield of different reference countries as follows:  
 
yNordic country,t  – yReference country,t  =  cj  +  εt,   t = Tj–1+1, ... , Tj. (2) 
 
The two subsequent sections present robustness analyses of two variants of spreads. 
6.1  Nordic spreads in the Stockholm market 
First we estimate structural breaks in weekly yield spreads using Nordic yields in Stock-
holm and one of three reference yields: U.S. long-term (12 years) government bonds, U.S. 
short-term (3-5 year) Treasury notes, and the Swedish government yields. Obviously, the 
latter only allows robustness tests of the breaks in Danish, Finnish and Norwegian yields. 
The spreads over the Swedish yields are conceptually the best since they are denominated 
in the same currency and thereby best able to separate out macroeconomic shocks to 
nominal returns. While the U.S. yields only do this for globally common trends or shocks, 
they are still relatively suitable as the U.S. and the Nordic countries were similar in other 
respects: they were both outside the war at this period and yet their national economies   17
(and hence the forces driving nominal fluctuations) were highly affected by the wartime 
turbulence. 
 
Table 4 presents the findings of the robustness break analysis. Overall, the pre-war breaks 
in the basic yield analysis appear also in the spread analysis. In fact, there are even some 
earlier minor sovereign risk increases picked up in the spread breaks. The differences in 
timing (“Datediff.”) of the estimated breaks are mostly small (0 or 1 weeks), except in the 
Swedish case where the timing is more affected but still in the pre-war period. The size 
difference of the breaks (“Sizediff.”) is somewhat larger, with spreads mostly generating 
smaller breaks. In no instance, however, do the size switch sign which further reassures us 
regarding the robustness of the baseline findings of our yield analysis.  
6.2  Danish and Norwegian spreads in the Copenhagen and Oslo markets 
In a second set of robustness tests, we analyze Danish and Norwegian spreads in their 
home markets, subtracting one of the following reference yields: British 2.5% consol 
yields, Swiss confederate state and railway bonds, the U.S. long-term government yield, 
and the Swedish yield. Due to data availability we only have monthly series, and therefore 
we focus on spread changes over some specific pre-war time periods. Finland is left out 
because of its lack of domestic yields after early October 1939.  
 
In Figures 9 and 10, the different Danish and Norwegian spreads are displayed over the 
years 1938–1940. Looking at spread changes between the early pre-war period (1938–
early 1939) and the late pre-war period (1939/early 1940), that Danish spreads over U.S. 
and British yields increased markedly whereas they increased only moderately, and even 
decreased, over Swiss and Swedish yields, respectively. Over the same period, all Norwe-
gian yield spreads increased, three of them substantially and one of them (the Swedish) 
moderately. These results indicate that the significant pre-war threats observed in our basic 
break analysis remain in most yield spread definitions. Interestingly, the spreads over U.S. 
and British yields consequently increased more during 1939 than the Swiss, and especially 
the Swedish spreads did. The reasons for this heterogeneity are not obvious. While both 
Sweden and Switzerland were the only neutral countries, Britain was the only one to enter 
the war in 1939, Sweden was much more integrated economically than any of the other 
three and the U.S. is the only non-European country. Regardless of what, however, the 
main message is that the spreads contain much of the pre-war threats previously found.  
7  Concluding remarks 
Did the people in the Nordic countries expect that their own countries would be drawn into 
war activities during the turbulent years 1938–1940? We have in this paper examined two   18
different empirical methodologies and their answers to this question. In the first one, 
“conventional” Nordic World War II historical writing has argued that there were few, if 
any, in these countries who strongly believed in an attack on their countries. The second 
approach, by contrast, focuses on large shifts in Nordic government bond yields during 
1938–1940 and the fact that changes in these yields that coincide with important war 
events reflect changes in war risks that were assessed in real time by the contemporaries. 
 
Our main finding is that there are several instances of disagreement between the two inter-
pretations of history. While historians claim that the Nordic peoples felt safe until the au-
tumn of 1939 (in the case of Finland), the winter of 1939 (Sweden) and early April, 1940 
(Denmark and Norway), the prices of these countries’ sovereign debt fell considerably 
several months before these conjectured dates. In most cases, the yield shifts were direct 
responses to major war-related events such as the announcement of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop in late August 1939 or the Soviet attack on Finland in late November that year.  
 
We also find, however, points of agreement between historians and markets. For example, 
Norwegian yields in Oslo dropped after the truce between Finland and the Soviet Union, 
thereby somewhat reinforcing the widely held sentiments of reassurance described by his-
torians. Furthermore, all Nordic yields traded in Stockholm spiked one the outbreak of war 
was realized, i.e., in Finland in December 1939 and Denmark and Norway in April 1940. 
This clearly indicates that market traders had not fully anticipated the wars but only re-
garded them as likely to some degree (we propose assessed war probabilities in the range 
of 35%–54%).  
 
Although there are notable discrepancies between the two versions of history, our com-
parative analysis says little about any of them being either “right” or “wrong”. Both ap-
proaches suffer from methodological and data-related problems. For example, historians 
predominantly use text-based sources while past public opinions may hardly be evident in 
such data material. Historians’ selection and interpretation of the historical facts may also 
reflect views of their own political and social context, which might bias their conjectured 
war historiographies. On the other hand, the financial market-based analysis relies on the 
quality of the historical statistical data, which can often be questionable. Furthermore, the 
econometric method used relies on modeling choices and various assumptions that could 
be discussed. In other words, there are pros and cons with both approaches and we would 
therefore recommend a broad methodological approach when analyzing subtle issues con-
cerning the mind sets of large populations from in the past.   19
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Table 1: Nordic government bond loans analyzed in the study. 
Bond, loan period, coupon  Freq.  T  Ave.  Cur.  Analysis period  Source 
Stockholm market:            
Danish gov., 1936–56, 4%   Weekly  157 550  SEK  1/4/38–12/31/40  Affärsvärlden 
Finnish gov., 1934–44, 5%   Weekly  157 1160  SEK  1/4/38–12/31/40  Affärsvärlden 
Norwegian gov., 1934–59, 4%   Weekly  157 580  SEK  1/4/38–12/31/40  Affärsvärlden 
Swedish gov., consol, 3%   Weekly  157 330  SEK  1/4/38–12/31/40  Affärsvärlden 
Copenhagen market:            
Danish gov., 1934–59, 4%   Weekly  78  5460  DKK 10/1/38–4/5/40  Finanstidende 
Danish gov., 1934–59, 4%   Daily  189 4930  DKK 7/3/39–4/8/40  Berglinske 
Tidende 
Oslo market:            
Norwegian gov., 1937–68, 4.5%  Daily  212 510  NOK 8/2/39–4/8/40  Morgenbladet, 
Aftenposten 
Helsinki market:            
Finnish gov., 1935–60, 5%   Daily  238 510  FIM  1/3/39–10/10/39  Hufvudstads-
bladet 
U.S. market:            
U.S. gov., 1938-40, 12-yrs  Weekly  36  237  USD  1/4/38–12/31/40  Fed. Reserve
a 
U.S. T-Note, 1938–40, 3-5-yrs   Weekly  36  63  USD  1/4/38–12/31/40  Fed. Reserve
b 
British market:            
British consol, 1938–40, 2.5%  Daily  36  352  GBP  1/38–12/40  LN
c 
Swiss market:            
Swiss gov., 1938-40.  Monthly  36  372  SWF  1/38–12/40  LN
c 
Note: “Freq.” denotes trading frequency, “T” is the number of observations, “Ave.” is the average mean 
level of the series used, “Cur.” is the currency in which the bond loan is denominated, “Period” is the period 
for which each bond is analyzed, restricted either by the time focus of the study or data availability. 
a Federal Reserve Board (1943), Table 129: Bond yields, by type of security, weekly, 1934–1941. 
b Federal Reserve Board (1943), Table 121: Short-term open-market rates in New York City, weekly, 1934–
1941. 
c League of Nations, Table 109 (1938–39), 105 (1940-41): Percentage Yields of Bonds.    23
Table 2: Structural breaks in Nordic sovereign yields. Stockholm market, 1938-1940. 
Country, 





(basis points)  Contemporaneous war event 
Denmark  Copenhagen market, Daily series, Jul.1939–Apr.1940 
No. 1  8/25/1939  [–2, +1]  +51  German-Soviet anti-aggression pact 
No. 2  9/26/1939  [–4, +1]  +71  Outbreak of World War II 
No. 3  2/14/1940  [–1, +6]  +54  Altmark incident (?) 
  Copenhagen market, Weekly series, Oct.1938–Apr.1940 
No. 1  9/22/1939  [–1, +1]  +120  Outbreak of World War II 
No. 2  2/16/1940  [–1, +2]  +54  Altmark incident (?) 
  Stockholm market, Weekly series, Jan.1938–Dec.1940 
No. 1  12/13/1938  [–6, +6]  +13   
No. 2  3/28/1939  [–19, +1]  +40  Germany annexes Czechoslovakia 
No. 3  8/22/1939  [–6, +2]  +136  German-Soviet anti-aggression pact 
No. 4  12/5/1939  [-2, +3]  +215  Soviet Union attacks Finland 
No. 5  4/9/1940  [–38, +1]  +361  Germany invades Denmark 
Finland  Helsinki market, Daily series, Jan.1939–Oct.1939 
No. 1  2/2/1939  [–4, +1]  –5   
No. 2  3/30/1939  [–27, +1]  +6   
No. 3  9/6/1939  [–1, +1]  +62  Outbreak of World War II 
  Stockholm market, Weekly series, Jan.1938–Dec.1940 
No. 1  9/5/1939  [–6, +6]  +864  Outbreak of World War II 
No. 2  12/9/1939  [–19, +1]  +2,083  Soviet Union attacks Finland 
No. 3  4/2/1940  [–6, +2]  –1,298  Finnish-Soviet peace treaty 
Norway  Oslo market, Daily series, Aug.1939–Apr.1940 
No. 1  9/8/1939  [–3, 0]  +38  Outbreak of World War II 
No. 2  10/16/1939  [–2, +13]  +17   
No. 3  12/11/1939  [–1, +1]  +48  Soviet Union attacks Finland 
No. 4  1/29/1939  [–1, +3]  +29   
No. 5  3/13/1939  [–1, +1]  –55  Outbreak of World War II 
  Stockholm market, Weekly series, Jan.1938–Dec.1940 
No. 1  9/5/1939  [–1, +2]  +201  Outbreak of World War II 
No. 2  12/26/1939  [–1, +1]  +176  Soviet Union attacks Finland 
No. 3  4/30/1940  [–1, +1]  +333  Germany invades Norway 
No. 4  9/10/1940  [–1, +2]  –243  Norwegian resistance ends (Aug.) 
Sweden  Stockholm market, Weekly series, Jan.1938–Dec.1940 
No. 1  4/18/1939  [–26, +1]  +8   
No. 2  9/12/1939  [–2, +1]  +60  Outbreak of World War II 
No. 3  12/26/1939  [–1, +3]  +44  Soviet Union attacks Finland 
No. 4  4/9/1940  [–15, +3]  +15  Germany attacks Denmark/Norway 
No. 5  7/30/1940  [–1, +2]  –49   
Note: The table shows the number of breaks selected by the procedure of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003), their 
95% confidence interval in brackets showing the number of periods (days or weeks) surrounding the break 
date, the size of the break in numbers of basis points (the difference between average yields in the segments 
before and after the break), and a political or military event coinciding with the break.   24
Table 3: Nordic government bond loans analyzed in the study. 
Public pre-war threat assessments 
according to... 
 
Country Time  period 
Historians
a  Bond markets
b Agreement? 
 – Mar.  1939  None  None  Yes 
Apr. 1939  –  Aug. 25, 1939 None  Some  No  Denmark 
Aug. 25, 1939  –  Apr. 1940  None  Some/Large  No 
  –  Aug. 23, 1939 None  None  Yes 
Aug. 23, 1939  –  Sep. 1939  None  Some/Large  No  Finland 
Oct. 1939  –  Nov. 1939  Some  Large  No 
 – Aug.  1939  None  None  Yes 
Sep. 1939  –  Mar. 13, 1940 None  Some/Large  No  Norway 
Mar. 13, 1940  –  Apr. 9, 1940  None  Some  No 
1938  –  Aug. 30, 1939 None  None  Yes 
Sep. 1, 1939  –  Nov. 30, 1939 None  Some  No  Sweden 
Dec. 1, 1939  –    Some  Some  Yes 
Note: When the market-based assessment says “Some/Large” this refers to the fact that the domestic yields 
reflected smaller threat increases than the foreign yields did in response to the same political events. 
a Based on the outlined historical writing in Section 2. 
b Based on structural break estimates Table 3.   25
Table 4: Robustness analysis: Structural breaks in Nordic spreads. Stockholm market, 1938-1940. 
Bond yield    Spread over Swedish bond yield    Spread over U.S. bond yield    Spread over U.S. Treasury Notes 
Date Size   Date  Datediff. Size  Sizediff.   Date  Datediff. Size Sizediff.   Date  Datediff. Size  Sizediff. 
Denmark                             
              4/12/38   25     4/12/38   40  
12/6/38 13                     12/6/38 0  54 41 
3/21/39 40   3/21/39 0  80 40    3/14/39 1  77  37          
8/15/39 249            8/15/39 0  229  –20    8/8/39 1  252  3 
     11/28/39   212                   
4/2/40 458   4/9/40 1  373  –85    4/2/40 0 481  23    4/2/40 0  473  15 
Finland                            
     1/24/39  –18             4/12/38   43  
8/29/39 864   8/15/39 2 711  –153    8/29/39 0  852  –11    8/15/39 2 739  –124 
12/12/39 2083    12/5/39 1  1197 –886    12/12/39 0 2109  26    12/5/39 1  1270 –813 
3/26/40 –1298            3/26/40 0 –1287           
Norway                            
                       4/12/38   46  
     3/7/39  24     3/21/39   65     3/21/39  105  
8/29/39 201   8/29/39 0 123  –79    8/29/39 0  144  –57          
12/19/39 176    12/26/39 1  134  –42    12/19/39 0 202  26    12/5/39 1 281  105 
4/23/40 333   4/30/40 1 328  –4    4/23/40 0  329 –4    4/16/40 1 321  –12 
9/3/40 243   8/27/40 1 269  26    9/3/40 0 272  30    8/27/40 1 273  31 
Sweden                            
              9/20/38   15     4/12/38   34  
4/11/39 8            4/11/39 0  35  27    2/21/39 7  28 19 
9/5/39 60                     10/10/39 5 74  14 
12/19/39 44             11/14/39 10 76 32    1/23/40 5  48 5 
4/2/40 15            2/27/40 5  33  18          
7/23/40 –49            6/11/40 6  –29      5/21/40 9 –42 7 
Note: “Bond yield” reproduces parts of the results in Table 2. “Date” denotes break date and “Size” break size (as in Table 3). “Datediff.” denotes the number of weeks that 
differ between the structural breaks estimated for bond yields (eq. (1)) and bond spreads (eq. (2)). “Sizediff.” is the corresponding difference in estimated break sizes.   26













































Trading halt on 
Apr. 9, 1940 due to 
German invasion
 















































Trading halt on 
Apr. 9, 1940 due to 
German invasion
 
Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
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Danish sovereign yields in Stockholm Fitted structural breaks
German anectation of 
Czechoslovakia (Mar. 15, 1939)
WWII outbreak
(Sep. 1, 1939)
German invasion of Denmark
(Apr. 9, 1940)
Soviet attack on Finland
(Nov. 30, 1939)
 











































Finnish sovereign yields in Helsinki Fitted structural breaks
WWII outbreak 
(Sep. 1, 1939)
Trading halt on Oct. 11, 
1939 by rule of the 
Helsinki Stock Exchange
 
Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2. 
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Finnish sovereign yields in Stockholm Fitted structural breaks
WWII outbreak
(Sept. 1, 1939)














































Norwegian sovereign yields in Oslo Fitted structural breaks
WWII outbreak 
(Sep. 1, 1939)
Soviet Union attacks 
Finland (Nov. 30, 1939)
Finnish-Sovet truce 
(Mar. 13, 1940)
Trading halt on Apr. 
9, 1940 due to 
German invasion
 
Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2.   29











































Norway (Apr. 9, 1940)
Soviet attack on Finland
(Nov. 30, 1939)
 









































Swedish sovereign yields in Stockholm Fitted structural breaks
WWII outbreak
(Sep. 1, 1939)
German invasion of Denmark 
and Norway (Apr. 9, 1940)
Soviet attack on Finland
(Nov. 30, 1939)
 
Note: The figure is based on results in Table 2.   30
































Danish spread over U.S. yield Danish spread over British yield
Danish spread over Swedish yield Danish spread over Swiss yield











































Norwegian spread over U.S. yield Norwegian spread over Swedish yield
Norwegian spread over British yield Norwegian spread over Swiss yield
WWII outbreak German invasion
 